INTRODUCTION
Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) was first introduced by Yang et al. [1] as an encryption scheme that is able to check whether two ciphertexts under different public keys as well as the same public key contain the same message or not. This feature can be applied to various scenarios in practice, such as keyword search on encrypted data, to facilitate efficient management by partitioning encrypted data in the cloud, personal health record systems, and other systems, and several improved PKEET schemes have been proposed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ] to achieve better performance or to support additional functionalities. Recently, Huang et al. [7] proposed a public key encryption with authorized equality test (PKE-AET), which allows an authorized tester to perform equality tests on all of the receiver's ciphertexts or a specified ciphertext with respect to the warrant issued by the receiver.
It was claimed that their scheme achieves one-wayness under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (OW-CCA2) against Type-I adversaries who have a warrant and the indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) against Type-II adversaries who do not have a warrant.
In this paper, we identify a flaw in the IND-CCA2 security of Huang et al.'s PKE-AET. CCA security games for public key encryption allow attackers to request queries to decryption oracles. In particular, contrary to CCA1, attackers can utilize the challenge ciphertext for queries to the decryption oracle after the challenge phase in the IND-CCA2 security game. We note that the authors of [7] did not carefully consider CCA2 attacks in the proof of the IND-CCA2 security of their scheme. The situation is actually worse, because we also illustrate a polynomial time CCA2 attack on their scheme, which shows that the fault in their proof causes an actual threat on the security of the scheme.
Let us briefly explain the idea of our CCA2 attack. The plaintext space of Huang et al.'s scheme is a cyclic group G with a generator g of order q. A ciphertext of a message m has the following form:
where (g α , g β ) is the receiver's public key, H 1 and H 2 are hash functions, and γ is an element in Z * q chosen by the encryption algorithm. The authors of [7] seem to consider that it is difficult to obtain
respectively, if the computational DiffieHellman (CDH) problem is intractable. However, the adversary chooses two messages with their discrete logarithm to the base g in the IND-CCA2 security H.T. Lee, S. Ling, J. H. Seo, and H. Wang game, so he can recover H 1 ((g α ) γ ) from c 2 using c 1 and the discrete logarithms of the challenge messages with high probability, even though he does not know γ. Further, since he does not know the exact value of γ, he cannot obtain the exact value of H 2 ((g β ) γ ). However, instead he can obtain (0 γ) ⊕ H 2 ((g β ) γ ) with high probability and this is sufficient to generate a new valid ciphertext. Therefore, their intuitive method is insufficient to prevent CCA2 attacks and our suggested attack works well.
We also provide a rectified version of their scheme to achieve the IND-CCA2 security. Our modification is quite simple and the role of the modified part is clear, where the key feature of our attack is to generate a valid ciphertext from the challenge ciphertext without hash queries. Therefore, we make a link between c 2 and c 3 to prevent reuse of part of the challenge ciphertext for queries to the decryption oracle. Thus, we modify the encryption algorithm for a message m by inserting m γ into the input of the hash function for the third component of a ciphertext. As a consequence, we only change the third component of the ciphertext of a message m to
such that c 2 and c 3 share m γ . Therefore, the adversary is forced to request the hash value of the hash function H 2 to the hash oracle in order to generate another valid ciphertext, and thus we can correct their scheme and its security proof.
We note that our solution additionally requires only one hash computation of a two times longer input for both the encryption and decryption algorithms. The output sizes of all algorithms including the hash function H 2 are the same as before, so the sizes of ciphertexts and warrants are also exactly the same as before. Therefore, our solution has practically the same performance as the original scheme in terms of its efficiency and storage.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we introduce Huang et al.'s PKE-AET scheme and its security argument. Section 3 presents our CCA2 attack against their scheme. We provide a modification of their scheme to achieve the IND-CCA2 security in Section 4.
HUANG ET AL.'S PKE-AET SCHEME
In this section, we look at Huang et al.'s PKE-AET scheme [7] and security definitions of PKE-AET scheme by focusing on the IND-CCA2 security against Type-II adversaries who have no warrant for equality test.
Notation. Throughout the paper, a $ ← A denotes that a is uniformly and randomly chosen from A for a set A and an element a in the set A. For a real number a, a denotes the smallest integer that is larger than or equal to a. ⊕ stands for the bitwise XOR operation and represents for concatenation.
The Description of Huang et al.'s Scheme
In this subsection, we provide the system model and the description of Huang et al.'s PKE-AET [7] .
The system of PKE-AET consists of a sender, a receiver, and a tester: A sender encrypts a message using a receiver's public key and passes a ciphertext to the receiver. After receiving the ciphertext, the receiver may decrypt it using his/her secret key. Once the receiver issues a warrant to a tester by encrypting with a tester's public key, the tester obtains the issued warrant by decrypting it, can verify it, and may perform equality test with it. We note that there are two types of warrants in Huang et al.'s PKE-AET; a receiver's warrant that enables to check equality for all of receiver's ciphertexts and a ciphertext's warrant that enables to check equality for the specified ciphertext.
The description of Huang et al.'s scheme is as follows:
• Setup(λ): On input a security parameter λ, it selects two multiplicative groups G and G T of prime order q = q(λ) and a bilinear map e :
q+ log 2 q , and
log 2 q be cryptographic hash functions. It outputs a public parameter
• KeyGen(pp): On input pp, it selects random elements α, β $ ← Z * q and outputs a public key pk = (g α , g β ) and a secret key sk = (α, β).
• Enc(pk, m): On input the public key pk = (g α , g β ) and a message m ∈ G, it selects a random element γ $ ← Z * q and outputs
We note that the plaintext space of this algorithm is G.
• Dec(sk, c): On input the secret key sk = (α, β) and a ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ),
Output m if both of the above verifications pass. Otherwise, output ⊥.
• Authorization:
Aut r (sk, pk t ): On input the user's secret key sk = (α, β) and the tester's public key pk t = (g αt , g βt ),
1. Select a random element θ $ ← Z * q and compute a user's warrant rw = (g θ , α ⊕ H 3 (g βtθ )).
2. Send rw to the tester. 
3. Send cw to the tester.
• Verification:
Ver r (rw, pk, sk t ): On input the receiver's warrant rw = (w 1 , w 2 ), the receiver's public key pk = (g α , g β ), and the tester's secret key sk t = (α t , β t ),
On input the ciphertext's warrant cw = (w 1 , w 2 ), the receiver's public key pk = (g α , g β ), the tester's secret key sk t = (α t , β t ), and a ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ),
If it holds, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
• Test(c, w, c , w , sk t ): On input two ciphertexts c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), two warrants w ∈ {rw, cw}, w ∈ {rw , cw }, and the tester's secret key sk t = (α t , β t ), it performs as follows:
1. Compute z on input c and w by the followings: (a) For a receiver's warrant rw = (w 1 , w 2 ),
It also computes z on input c and w by the same way as above. 3. Check whether e(c 1 , z ) = e(c 1 , z). If it holds, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
We note that the authorization, verification, and test algorithms are not affected by the third component of the ciphertext, except for the validity check of the ciphertext using the decryption algorithm. Because our rectification in Section 4 modifies only the third component of the ciphertext (and the decryption algorithm by reflecting it) from the original Huang et al.'s scheme, we do not need to modify the authorization, verification, and test algorithms. Remark 1. In the original scheme, the receiver's warrant rw, which is the output of the authorization algorithm Aut r (sk, pk t ) was defined by
It is very similar to a ciphertext of the ElGamal encryption scheme [8] . However, while α belongs to Z * q , H 1 (g βtθ ) belongs to G, and hence the multiplication between α and H 1 (g βtθ ) is not defined. To rectify it, we first publish an additional cryptographic hash function H 3 in the setup algorithm and slightly modify authorization, verification, and test algorithms for receiver's warrant as we have presented above. We note that this modification is irrelevant to our attack since it does not utilize any warrants.
Security of Huang et al.'s Scheme
In PKE-AET, we consider the following two types of adversaries:
• Type-I adversary: The adversary who has a warrant and the tester's secret key, wants to reveal the message contained in the challenge ciphertext.
• Type-II adversary: The adversary who does not have a warrant, wants to distinguish whether the challenge ciphertext contains which message between two candidates.
In this paper, we focus on the IND-CCA2 security against Type-II adversaries only.
We define the IND-CCA2 security with the following game between the adversary A and the challenger C:
1. Setup: C generates n pairs of public key and secret key and sends all public keys to the adversary A.
Phase 1:
A is allowed to query to the decryption oracle polynomially many times. 3. Challenge: A first selects one user U j as the challenge target. He then generates his own public key pk t and secret key sk t and selects two messages m 0 and m 1 of the same length. Thereafter, he forwards (pk j , pk t , sk t , m 0 , m 1 ) to C. C randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1}, runs Enc(pk j , m b ) → c * b , and sends c * b to A.
Phase 2:
A queries to the oracles as in Step 2 polynomially many times. The constraint is that the challenger ciphertext c * b is not allowed to be queried to the decryption oracle. 5. Guess: A outputs b ∈ {0, 1}.
We define the advantage of A in the above game by
Huang et al. claimed that their scheme is IND-CCA2 secure against Type-II adversaries under the CDH assumption. We introduce the formal definition of the CDH assumption below. We note that we will also provide a rectified version of Huang et al.'s scheme under the CDH assumption. for a security parameter λ. The computational DiffieHellman (CDH) problem is defined as follows: Given (g, g µ , g ν ) for randomly chosen µ, ν ∈ Z * p , a PPT algorithm A finds the value g µν with the advantage
We say that the CDH assumption on G holds if for any PPT algorithm A, the advantage of A is negligible in the security parameter λ.
OUR ADAPTIVE CHOSEN CIPHER-TEXT ATTACK
Now, we present a CCA2 attack on Huang et al.'s PKE-AET against Type-II adversaries and explain the flaw in their security proof.
Our Attack. The description of our attack algorithm is as follows:
1. In the challenge phase of the IND-CCA2 security game, the adversary randomly selects x 0 and x 1 from Z * q , computes m 0 = g x0 and m 1 = g x1 , and sends them to the challenger.
Once the challenge ciphertext
is returned for randomly chosen γ ∈ Z * q and b ∈ {0, 1} by the challenger, the adversary computes
Thereafter, he chooses z $ ← Z * q , setsm = g z , and computesc
where 0 log 2 q is the ( log 2 q )-bit string of 0's. He queries (ĉ 1 ,c 2 ,c 3 ) to the decryption oracle. 3. If the decryption oracle respondsm, the adversary outputs 0. Otherwise, output 1. For the confirmation, the adversary may repeat
Step 2 by replacing x 0 and m 0 with x 1 and m 1 in the equations (1) and (3), respectively.
At
Step 2, if the challenge ciphertextĉ is an encryption of m 0 , i.e., m b = m 0 , then
and
Therefore,
is a valid ciphertext of the messagem and the decryption oracle should respondm. If the challenge ciphertextĉ is an encryption of m 1 , A is not H 1 (g αγ ) and hence (ĉ 1 ,c 2 ,c 3 ) is not a ciphertext ofm. In this case, therefore, the decryption oracle should return other value m =m in G or ⊥. Furthermore, we note that the adversary may confirm whether the challenge ciphertext is an encryption of m 1 or not by repeating
Step 2 with m 1 and x 1 .
The Flaw in Their Security Proof. Now, we briefly explain the flaw in the security proof of their scheme. In Game 3 and Game 3-1 of the proof, the challenger who is simultaneously the solver of the CDH problem on the given instance (g, g µ , g ν ), sets g αj = g νδj and g βj = g νδ j in the setup phase, where δ j and δ j are randomly chosen elements from Z * q by the challenger. Then, the challenger terminates the simulation once H 1 (g αj µ ) or H 2 (g βj µ ) is requested to the hash oracles (denoted this event by E in their paper), because he can obtain the solution of the CDH problem on the instance (g, g µ , g ν ) from g αj µ or g βj µ by computing (g αj µ )
Further, he can detect the event E by computing whether e(g, h 1 ) = e(g µ , g ν ) δj and e(g, h 2 ) = e(g µ , g ν )
for all stored (h 1 , h 1 ) ∈ τ 1 and (h 2 , h 2 ) ∈ τ 2 , where τ 1 and τ 2 are the hash lists corresponded to the hash queries for hash functions H 1 and H 2 , respectively. In our attack, however, the attacker can obtain a valid ciphertext from the challenge ciphertext without hash queries to the hash oracles, even though a ciphertext is related to the instance of the CDH problem. Hence, although the decryption oracle should output the right answer for the correct simulation, the challenger cannot detect it and so the decryption oracle cannot provide the right answer to the attacker. Therefore, the simulation of the challenger is wrong.
To rectify it, we make the adversary query g αj ν or g βj ν to the hash oracles in order to generate a valid ciphertext by modifying the challenge ciphertext. Considering the above, we attempt to modify the scheme in the next section.
RECTIFICATION OF THE SCHEME
In this section, we provide a rectified version of Huang et al.'s scheme to achieve the IND-CCA2 security against Type-II adversaries. Our modification is very simple:
In the encryption algorithm, we additionally insert m γ into the input of the hash function along with g βγ for the third component of a ciphertext. Then, we fix the decryption algorithm by reflecting the modification of the encryption algorithm.
The detail description of our modification is as follows:
• Enc (pk, m): On input the public key pk = (g α , g β ) and a message m ∈ G, it selects a random element γ $ ← Z * q and outputs
• Dec (sk, c): On input the secret key sk = (α, β) and a ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), We note again that the above rectification modifies only the third component of the ciphertext (and the decryption algorithm by reflecting it) from the original Huang et al.'s scheme. Since the original authorization, verification, and test algorithms are not affected by the third component of the ciphertext, except for the validity check of the ciphertext using the decryption algorithm, we can still utilize the same authorization, verification, and test algorithms without changing from the original scheme.
Theorem 4.1. Our modification is IND-CCA2 secure against Type-II adversaries if the CDH assumption holds in the random oracle model. Proof. (Sketch) As we already pointed out several times, the flaw in the proof in [7] is only associated with the decryption oracle queries on ciphertexts obtained by modifying the challenge ciphertext. Therefore, the proof of this theorem is almost the same with those of Theorem 6 and 7 in [7] , except for the simulation about decryption oracle queries on such ciphertexts. Let us sketch the differences between their proofs and ours by focusing on the simulation for such the decryption oracle queries and its analysis.
• Naturally, at Step (3) of Game 0 in the proof of Theorem 6 in [7] , the challenge ciphertext should be changed tô
• Now, at Step (2) of Game 3-1 in the proof of Theorem 7 in [7] , for the decryption queries on a ciphertext c * = (c * From the above, we confirm that H 2 (g βj γ R) for some R should be ever requested to the hash oracle for generating a valid ciphertext from the challenge ciphertext. Hence, the challenger can terminate once H 2 (g βj γ R) is requested. Therefore, we can fix the flaw in the proof of the original scheme with our modification. We omit the detail of the proof.
Efficiency Comparison. We can easily check that the size of the ciphertext obtained with our correct method is exactly the same as that with the original scheme. We make no other modifications except in the encryption and decryption algorithms, so the sizes of the warrants are also exactly the same as those in the original method.
The only difference in the encryption algorithm is the input length of the hash function H 2 , where the length in our method is two times longer than that in the original scheme. However, an exponentiation operation is generally much more expensive than computing a hash function and our encryption algorithm takes 4 exponentiations, hence we might ignore this difference in length. The decryption algorithm is also modified slightly, but it requires 4 exponentiations, which have the same cost as the original decryption algorithm.
In summary, our modified version has almost the same performance as the original method in terms of efficiency and storage.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we provided a CCA2 attack on the recently proposed public key encryption with authorized equality test, which was claimed to be IND-CCA2 secure against Type-II adversaries [7] . We also modified the scheme so that it achieves the IND-CCA2 security under the CDH assumption in the random oracle model by adding a value related to the message as an input in one of the hash functions in the encryption algorithm. We note that our modified version has almost the same performance as the original method in terms of both efficiency and storage.
